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Stoic Equanimity in the Face of Torture
Nancy Sherman
Introduction
 I begin with reflections of Jacobo Timerman, an Argentine Jew and editor 
and publisher of the newspaper La Opinion from 1971 until his arrest in April 
1977 by an extremist faction of the Argentine Army. He was held captive for thirty 
months and tortured and interrogated inside the army’s clandestine prisons. He 
offers advice for those who may face torture:
Memory is the chief enemy of the solitary tortured man—nothing 
is more dangerous at such moments. But I managed to develop 
certain passivity-inducing devices for withstanding torture and 
anti-memory devices for those long hours in the solitary cell.  
I refused to remember anything that bore on life experience —  
I was a professional stoic dedicated to this task. 1
 Timerman’s remarks point us to my specific interest in this paper — namely, 
stoic equanimity in torture. In particular, I want to ask: In what ways, if any, is 
stoic equanimity a plausible armor for enduring torture? More generally, is the case 
of torture instructive for understanding stoic equanimity as a more generalized 
kind of resilience and mode of well-being? Admittedly, I pick an extreme case, 
but I believe we can learn something about more ordinary cases by considering 
equanimity in the hard case.
 As Timerman fashions it, his “professional stoicism” is a “mechanism of 
withdrawal” that helped him avoid lapsing into “that other mechanism of 
tortured solitary prisoners,” namely rapport building with a jailor or torturer 
(37).2 This stoicism, as he put it, allowed him to cast aside “all logical emotions 
and sensations — fear, hatred, vengeance — for any emotion or sensation meant 
wasting useless energy” (35). Memories of his wife and children, and emotional 
longings for them, could only be viewed as “penetration from the outside world” 
that a victim of torture cannot afford to indulge.  (85) “The image of my wife’s face 
is unbearable in this place” (84). If he is to survive, he must be a “blind architect,” 
reconstructing a world from the stimuli of his new, perverted environment — 
the moans and hysterical screams, the odor of the latrine that matches his own 
stench, the violent sound of metal and barking dogs, the constant shouting of 
guards meant to “intimidate and confuse prisoners” (83).
 Timerman appeals to a popularized notion of being stoic as essentially a 
dissociation or splitting from painful aspects of reality that would either sap 
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one of mental energy or weaken control. My interest, here and more recently in 
Stoic Warriors, is ancient Stoicism, as a philosophical doctrine of emotions and 
a therapeutic set of tools.  But certain aspects of popularized stoicism, perhaps 
not surprisingly, bear relation to ancient versions. This shall become clearer 
as we proceed. But first, I want to recall that another victim of 20th Century 
torture, Jim Stockdale, relied in a studied and deliberate way on his reading of 
ancient Stoicism as a survival tool. So in a prescient moment on September 9, 
1965, James Stockdale, then a young naval aviator, muttered to himself as he 
was shot down by the North Vietnamese, “Five years down there at least, I’m 
leaving behind the world of technology and entering the world of Epictetus.” As 
a graduate student at Stanford, Stockdale had received a copy of the Enchiridion 
before deploying to Vietnam. In an uncanny way, he committed it to memory 
and found himself relying on it routinely in what would become seven and one-
half years of imprisonment in the Hanoi Hilton, two and one-half years of which 
were in solitary confinement. As head of the chain of command of POW’s in the 
Hanoi Hilton, Stockdale made Stoicism the backbone of his leadership style.
 By looking at examples and text, my ultimate focus will be on how and whether 
a version of ancient Stoicism can defend against a fundamental vulnerability that 
torture aims to lay bear—namely that one will use one’s will against oneself in 
acts of collusion and self-betrayal. A Stoic, I suggest should argue that this, more 
than physical and certain other psychological forms of abuse, is at the heart of 
the specific moral challenge of torture,3 and something that should be of key 
concern to any Stoic account. The discussion moves to this point.
But first, I proceed with a brief reminder of Stoicism’s break with Aristotelian 
notions of eudaimonia (well-being), second, consider the Stoic conception of 
apatheia (freedom from emotions) and the room it leaves for emotions, third take 
up Stoic notions of physical pain and the endurance of bodily torture, and fourth 
come to the challenge of torture as implicating the will in acts of self-betrayal. 
Finally, I reverse perspectives and ask if Stoic apatheia might be used to train a 
future torturer to become desensitized to the evil of torture. Ironically, Stoicism’s 
most exportable lesson may be in averting that evil rather than in learning how 
to endure, with equanimity, torture itself.
1. Stoicism’s Break with Aristotelian Eudaimonia
 The ancient Greek Stoics break with the Aristotelian claim that eudaimonia, 
well-being, happiness, or flourishing, is a matter of both the internal goods of 
wisdom or virtue and the external goods, such as health, prosperity, honor, and 
good fortune. If happiness is to be, as many ancient ethical theories stipulate, 
not only the most complete and self-sufficient good, but also the most stable and 
permanent human good,4 then it must be restricted to the excellent activity of 
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one’s rational agency, namely virtue or wisdom. Moroever, ordinary emotions, 
such as pleasure and pain, desire and fear, and their many subtypes, in so far as 
they are paradigmatically attachments to external goods as important investments 
and aversions, will not be part of the sage’s moral psyche. The ancient criticism 
of this conception of well-being is clear in Cicero:
People come eagerly expecting to hear why pain is not an evil. 
The Stoics tell them that pain is a tough, unpleasant burden, 
contrary to nature and hard to bear—but not an evil, because it 
involves no wrongdoing, dishonesty or vice, no blameworthiness 
or cause for shame. Will anyone who hears this know whether 
to laugh or cry? They will certainly not leave any more resolute 
in enduring pain than when they arrived.5
 The Stoic concession that Cicero is referring to—that pain is a “tough, 
unpleasant burden, contrary to nature”–is captured by the Stoic notion of the 
“indifferents.” Conventional (or external) goods and evils are roughly those that 
are in accord with or contrary to nature. So health is in accord with nature; disease 
or torture, contrary to it. Though these do not coincide with genuine good and 
evil (which are restricted to virtue and vice) and are thus “indifferents,” they are 
nonetheless things a sage selects and disselects, as “preferred” or “dispreferred.” 
Thus, the sage would prefer a life off the rack rather than on it. But even if the 
latter is his bad fortune, that fact ought not derail his virtue and thus, his well-
being.
 Ancient and modern readers alike have viewed this claim as wildly 
counterintuitive. Either the Stoics are guilty of a massive neologism, with the 
indifferents masquerading as a kind of (subordinate) happiness (with questions 
then raised as to the substantive difference between the Stoic and peripatetic 
i.e., Aristotelian, conceptions of happiness), or the Stoic view of well-being 
has no application to anything that resembles flesh and blood human beings. 
And yet, many reflective people draw, with varying degrees of success, on Stoic 
consolations. How do we assess these consolations and what are the plausible, 
exportable lessons?6
 Stoicism’s underlying consolation is that the final good or happiness is a kind 
of apatheia, free from the stresses and perturbations of emotional investment in 
the vicissitudes of life. However, it is important for us to make clear that the sage’s 
apatheia is not an emotionless state, but rather is a kind of eupatheia—state of 
fine emotions.  This becomes important for understanding what Stoic resilience 
under torture might look like.
4
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2. Protoemotions and “Good Emotions”
 There are two critical qualifications to the notion of sage-like freedom from 
emotions. First, the Stoics note that even the sage will experience protoemotional 
phenomena (propatheia) that are involuntary. These phenomena contrast with 
ordinary, full-fledged emotions, which, according to the Stoics’ cognitivist view, 
are voluntary and fully assented-to appraisals. So, they say, a sage may experience 
tremors and blushing, turn pallid or green when caught off-guard by a fright or 
sudden lapse of confidence. But a true sage never allows these protoemotions 
to turn into full emotions. He nips them in the bud. More accurately, he does 
not assent to the impulsive impressions.
 Seneca’s On Anger (1st Century CE) and Aulis Gellius’s Attic Nights (2nd Century 
CE) are among the sources often cited for the doctrine of propatheia. So Seneca 
tells us that a preemotion of anger is that “first mental jolt which affects us when 
we think ourselves wronged. This steals upon us.” He continues by saying that we 
may be “incited” by the “martial sound of trumpets” or a “gruesome painting” 
or the “grim sight of the justest punishment.” “The fiercest soldier may tremble 
a little as the signal is given for battle;” “a great general’s heart is in his mouth 
before the lines have charged against one another.” But startles and jolts like 
this, momentary arousals, are not full emotions:
If anyone thinks that pallor, falling tears, sexual excitement or 
deep sighing, a sudden glint in the eyes or something similar 
are an indication of emotion or evidence for a mental state, he 
is wrong; he fails to see that these are just bodily agitations.
In short, preemotions lack “the mind’s assent” necessary for a full emotion.
Aulus Gellius humorously narrates a similar view. He reports that he was aboard 
a ship with a Stoic when they were caught in a violent storm. The Stoic got 
jittery and grew pale, and Aulis asked him tactfully (after an uppity rich Greek, 
had asked him with less tact), How could this be? The eminent Stoic answered 
by appeal to the teachings of Epictetus: that even the mind of the sage “must 
shrink and feel alarm” at the occurrence of some terrifying sound or sight. But, 
he added, the sage never voluntarily assents to these impressions as genuine evils 
in the offing. “He rejects and scorns them.” He doesn’t see in them anything 
that ought to excite fear.”7
 A less noted, but insightful source is Philo of Alexandria (b. 20 BCE), 
himself unlikely to have had direct familiarity with the writings of either Seneca 
or Gellius, and so, most probably, an independent source of earlier, ancient 
Greek doctrine.8 Philo presents a version of the doctrine of protoemotions in 
his exegesis of Genesis. He asks us to consider Genesis 23.2-3. This is the passage, 
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recall, in which Abraham appears to grieve over the death of Sarah: “Abraham 
came to bewail Sarah and to mourn.” However, according to Philo’s Stoic gloss, 
if Abraham is to be an allegorical9 paragon of the Stoic sage, then he cannot be 
grieving in the ordinary sense. So Philo stresses in his exegesis that since Abraham 
merely “came there to grieve,” he did not actually grieve. He had time, after being 
aroused by a seductive impression, to withhold full assent to the impression:
But excellent and carefully does (Scripture) show that the 
virtuous man did not resort to wailing or mourning but only 
came there for some such thing. For things that unexpectedly and 
against his will strike the pusillanimous man weaken, crush, and 
overthrow him, whereas everywhere they merely bow down the 
man of constancy when they direct their blows against him, and 
not in such a way as to bring (their work) to completion, since they 
are strongly repelled by the guiding reason and retreat.” (QGen 
4.73; italics added)
 Philo equally urges that the practitioner of devotional prayer should follow 
Abraham’s model:
And so it is not fitting for a man devoted to moral excellence to 
stand (fixed) in prayer when something happens against his will 
or to be entirely rapt and moved and drawn toward this, but he 
should somewhat gradually go toward it, and retire before the 
end is reached. (QGen.4.73)
 So at those moments when the devotee of virtue begins to be aroused by 
anger, grief, fear, or in the case at hand, the piety of prayer, if sufficiently advanced 
in moral progress, he can resist and reinsert his agency. In the above passage, 
Philo explicates in the language of physical movement—to go toward but retire 
before reaching. In other places, he makes clear that the giving of assent is what 
is critical. Thus, in Genesis 17 Abraham laughs when he thinks to himself that 
he, a centenarian, is going to father a child. For Philo’s purposes, it is critical 
that Abraham is only thinking the thoughts that make him laugh (QGen III.56). 
Entertaining a thought is not asserting it. The laugh is not the real thing, but only 
a potential prelude10 to it that Abraham, as sage, can resist: “words spoken by 
tongue and mouth fall under transgressions and punishment. But those which 
are in the mind are not at all guilty.”11
 Thus, emotional prearousals are, according to Stoic doctrine, meant to be 
compatible with sage-like equanimity. Whether we draw the line as the Stoics 
do and call such arousals emotions or not, the Stoic point is that these kind of 
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affective phenomena, unlike more robust emotions, are involuntary and can 
be shaken off quickly. Of course, we might disagree on both counts. We might 
argue that many emotions proper, and not just physiological arousals at the 
penumbra of emotional experience (like starts and startles), have an element 
of the involuntary. Moreover, even if we restrict ourselves to starts and startles, 
we might challenge the assumption that the most resolute sorts of subjects can 
regain control after undergoing the most violent versions of these jolts.   Torture 
seems to be a lab for just that kind of experiment.
 Indeed, one would expect that there is a substantive difference between 
prolonged and/or harsh exposure to what psychologists call “traumatic stressors” 
and more titrated exposures in relatively controlled conditions (such as perhaps 
administered to those who are learning how to survive torture, for example, in 
training schools12). It is not hard to imagine that even the most resilient Stoic 
sage would suffer degraded capacities for resistance after chronic exposure to the 
tools of terror.
 Seneca, though ever eager to downplay many varieties of fear as idle, and 
himself a firm believer that rehearsing dreaded evils in advance can remove much 
of the shock and awe that is part of terror, seems to agree that torture, and in 
particular, its “visuals” — the “spectacle” and “paraphernalia” of “the violence 
of the stronger” — are effective methods for engendering dread, even in those 
practiced to resist:
Picture to yourself under this head the prison, the cross, the rack, 
the hook, and the stake which they drive straight through a man 
until it protrudes from his throat. Think of human limbs torn 
apart by chariots driven in opposite directions, of the terrible shirt 
smeared and interwoven with inflammable materials, and of all 
the other contrivances devised by cruelty …. It is not surprising, 
then, if our greatest terror is of such a fate; for it comes in many 
shapes and its paraphernalia are terrifying .… Other troubles are 
not less serious .… they are, however, secret; they have no bluster 
and no heralding, but these, like huge arrays of war, prevail by 
virtue of their display and their equipment.13
 Seneca’s remarks are, in part, a salvo to his countrymen on the “cruel 
contrivances” to which Rome has grown accustomed for sport entertainment, 
notably gladiator games that draw the rich and poor alike to the Coliseum. (We 
might take similar heed to revelations of our own recent practices of torture for 
sadistic sport, show of dominance, or interrogation.) But Seneca’s observations 
are also prescient in understanding why the spectacle of torture can psychologically 
traumatize its victims. Certain threats and encounters with violence are traumatic, 
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Judith Herman instructs in her landmark 1992 book, Trauma and Recovery, “because 
they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life.”14 Here, Seneca anticipates 
this general point. “Displays” of imminent and intimate brutality “coerce and 
master the mind,” leaving us powerless. They overwhelm the human capacity 
for coping. The brute and violent images—“the disembowelled entrails of men,” 
“human limbs torn apart by chariots,” “the cross,” “the rack,” “the hook,” “the 
stake,”—all are meant to convey that human sensory and reactive capacities can 
absorb only so much before shutting down in terror.
 Seneca seems to be pointing to a kind of torture that has as a principal 
function spectacle and the show of power. Perhaps this, or torture primarily for 
the end of satisfying the sadistic needs of the torturer,15 is harder to endure than 
torture for the purpose of extracting intelligence, where the victim may believe, 
correctly or not, that he has some control in stopping the torture. Also, Seneca 
would have us believe that torture that introduces novel methods, which one 
could not in any way, physically or psychologically, prerehearse, would leave one 
less resistant. This seems to make sense. But the critical point is that he seems to 
acknowledge that some impressions of dread, lead not only to jolts and shocks, 
but full-blooded terror in the most resistant person. Even if the responses are 
involuntary, in the sense that impressions are not assented to as representing 
genuine evils, they nonetheless grip, last, and are not easily thrown overboard.
 While the Stoics introduce protoemotions as a way to marginalize 
counterexamples of wayward emotional arousal, they introduce “good emotions” 
or eupatheiai as a way positively to insert types of emotions that are consistent 
with and constitutive of a sage’s, calm life. “Good emotions” are the cultivated 
emotions that track recalibrated values and that replace ordinary emotions. Thus, 
the sage is not insensible, but moved by a new, more equable kind of feeling. The 
new emotions correspond in rough, taxonomic type to the old emotions. So the 
Stoics carve ordinary emotions into four basic genera—desire and fear, pleasure 
and distress. These and their many subspecies are responses to apparent goods 
and evils in the offing, as in the case of desire and fear, or apparent goods and 
evils in the present, as in the case of pleasure and distress. The eupathic versions 
are meant to retain some of the feel of emotions, but without their excess and 
misappraisals.16 They are experienced as calm, equable, smooth and fully rational 
or “consistent.” More specifically, in lieu of fear will be caution (eulabeia), described 
in some texts “as well-reasoned shrinking” or “avoidance” (ekklisis); in lieu of 
desire will be rational wish (boulêsis), described as “well-reasoned stretching” or 
“desiring” (orexis); in lieu of pleasure will be joy (chara) or “well-reasoned swelling” 
(eparsis).17 Significantly, there is no correlate to distress in the new taxonomy. 
And why? Cicero suggests that the sage, constitutionally, can do no evil and so 
will never experience the sort of distress or dejection that comes with doing it.18 
In this sense, there is nothing parallel to a nonsage’s regret, remorse, or shame. 
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This will become important in a moment.
 How to construe “good emotions” is left vague in the texts. But one 
possible interpretation is that they still track (or “respond to”) external goods, 
but appreciated as indifferents, and so as investments calibrated correctly in 
the proper hierarchy of goods. Alternatively, they are responses only to genuine 
good and evil, e.g., the striving to promote (or having strived to promote) virtue 
in oneself and others (in the case of wish and joy) and of striving to avoid vice 
(in the case of caution). On the latter interpretation, emotional attachment to 
indifferents is replaced by emotionless “selections and disselections.” But this 
second interpretation leaves us wondering whether a sage really still traffics, in 
any humanly recognizable way, in the ebb and flow of daily life.19
 One way to assuage concerns here is to combine the two interpretations. 
Rational caution, so interpreted, is not just be an abstract aversion to the possibility 
of future vice (“not having any of it,” so to speak), but wariness experienced 
precisely on those occasions that give rise to fear in others and cause them to 
buckle. It is a caution that warns a sage to steel himself against temptation in those 
circumstances where others succumb to fear of death, for example, or physical 
pain from torture.20 In this sense, the sage is not somehow fully inured to the 
dread of torture, but is able to see it as a circumstance that calls forth caution 
against that very response that might make him yield to a torturer too fast, or 
on terms that don’t exercise as much agency as possible.
 It is instructive to consider Philo again. His text concerns Sarah’s laugher 
when she, like Abraham, contemplates having a child at her ripe age (Gen 18.12-
15). Philo says that her laugh catches her on the cusp of a transitional leap before 
achieving sage-like calm: “The mind, which was about to be filled with joy and 
divine laughter, had not yet been freed from sorrow, fear, sense pleasure and 
desire, by which it is shaken and compelled to stagger.” Once she does learn 
that more perfect joy, the joy will be like that of the “high priest,” who “rejoicing 
inwardly” is released from corporeal thoughts. (QGen 4.15 –16). True, she may 
still, on occasion, express an involuntary “protoemotion” of laughter, but this 
won’t count against her status. It will be more like an old scar than a fresh wound. 
Sage-like laughter is at play, again, in Philo’s On Abraham XXXVI. The context 
is the explanation of Isaac’s name and God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice 
Isaac:
This laughter is not understood to be that laughter of the body 
which is frequent in childish sport, but is the result of a settled 
happiness and rejoicing of the mind. This kind of laughter the 
wise man is appropriately said to offer as a sacrifice to God; 
showing thus, by a figure, that to rejoice does properly belong 
to God alone. For the human race is subject to sorrow and to 
9
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exceeding fear, from evils which are either present or expected, so 
that men are either grieved at unexpected evils actually pressing 
upon them, or are kept in suspense, and disquietude, and fear 
with respect to those which are impending. But the nature of 
God is free from grief, and exempt from fear, and enjoys an 
immunity from every kind of suffering, and is the only nature 
which possesses complete happiness and blessedness. 21
 We may wonder about the appropriateness of laughter, divine or not, as a 
response to the demand to sacrifice a child. But that aside, what seems unequivocal 
is that torture is hardly the occasion for laughter. And so what of the normative 
position that a sage exhibit only equable, calm emotions, no fear or pain/distress, 
in enduring torture?
 As we noted earlier, there is nothing in a sage’s moral psyche parallel to a 
nonsage’s regret, remorse, or shame. Moral distress, understood as a reaction 
to voluntary wrongdoing or the misuse in some way of one’s will, is simply not 
within the sage’s constitutional capacity. For as a part of his moral trajectory and 
achievement, he will have outgrown the capacity for wrongdoing and misuse. 
Obviously, this restricted conception of distress leaves to the side the wide swath 
of ordinary distress feelings that seem rightly to record moral outrage or anger in 
response to the wrongdoing of others and to the suffering of innocents.  Equally, 
it leaves to the side a sense of pained pity and empathy at tragic suffering in 
general. The absence of these emotions sharpens the picture of the sage: He will 
not invest in what lies outside his rational will, or its exercise, or that is a clearly 
futile use of it. True, if there are things that he or others can do to ameliorate 
suffering or right injustice, then he will “rationally desire” them and this (boulêsis) 
will be the appropriate attitude informing and propelling such action.22  He will 
not require any extra “umph” from distress (which, in any event, by stipulation, 
he is not entitled to feel). And too, he will properly feel rational caution (labeia), 
warning him of  any stray temptations that might lead to moral transgressions 
or prudential missteps along the way. Additionally, like Abraham and Sarah, he 
will likely feel rational joy (chara), even laughter, supervening on his goodness. 
But to the degree that proper distress has as its object one’s own abuse or misuse 
of practical reason, the sage will, by definition, experience none of that.
 But this leaves us in the lurch about the case of torture. Is it plausible to 
assume that the most resilient torture victim’s profound dread of social isolation, 
of prolonged shackling and stress positions, of being made to feel as if drowning, 
will, in the case of a sage, fully resolve into something more manageable and 
agential—say, steadfast caution in these circumstances of allying with a torturer 
or of over-identifying with one’s body? Is it reasonable to assume that all other 
residue will just be the twinges or “scars,” as some of the texts say, of old emotional 
10
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habits manifest in involuntary preemotional expression? It is undoubtedly 
true that rational caution or vigilance are important to cultivate, especially, in 
circumstances, such as torture, where one is at peril of colluding against oneself 
and others to whom one is loyal. And it may be that the most resilient do cultivate 
that kind of wily vigilance. (Stockdale once described his POW mindset to me in 
the terms of Solzhenitsyn’s Ivan Denisovich—as a “slow moving cagey prisoner.” 
Another VN POW told me that he kept in his head a long list of dead baseball 
players and routinely gave out only those names when his captors demanded 
intelligence.23) But it is too quick to think that wily caution fully replaces (or we 
might say, sublimates) the expression of dread or pain when one is  thoroughly 
vulnerable, i.e., helpless. What of ordinary fear about the state of one’s family 
at home, or anxiety about its means for livelihood? Will these, in the case of the 
sage, reasonably be restricted to only protoemotional phenomena, experiences 
beneath the threshold of proper emotions, of which one can then say, “to me I 
say they are nothing?”
 Dread is anticipatory. What about feelings that are retrospective, such as 
shame that one has broken and revealed information, or shame that one has 
sought comfort in rapport with a torturer that leaves one vulnerable? What 
of shame that one has come to see oneself with contempt, through the eyes of 
the torturer? Surely, we want some instruction and, moreover, understanding 
about emotions that are responses to being caught in the helplessness of torture 
or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment — of being forced to do things or 
experience things that are demeaning and that one profoundly disavows (as in a 
Muslim, chained to the floor, while a woman interrogator smears what appears 
to be menstrual blood on his face.)24
 In a provocative and insightful article on the genesis of shame, David 
Velleman argues that shame is the morally appropriate response to a sense 
of compromised self-presentation. Shame is a failure to control one’s public 
persona, “a compromise of efforts at self-presentation.” 25 He explores, in part, 
why shame is connected to exposures of the private and argues that this has less 
to do with public disapproval or violation of norms than with a failure of efforts 
to control what one presents to the public. What is key for our purposes is that 
shame has to do with compromises of agency. To claim that a sage would never 
be in the position to express the emotions of such compromise seems to produce 
an ego ideal that has a limited use, ironically, in an exhortative philosophy that 
is, by and large, dedicated to the production of concrete moral exemplars via 
historical example and epistolary and meditative exercise. Seneca, certainly, is a 
letter writer and nightly meditator who reminds himself and his addressee that 
he is both the “doctor” and the “patient,” a progressor on the journey of moral 
enlightenment, but by no means, one who has or will ever arrive. And so we 
want lessons for the advanced progressor, even if the sage cannot offer them. 
11
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As in most of life, and here in the extreme, we want to know how to comply 
with norms in nonideal worlds. “There are no virgins here,” Stockdale once 
told a POW who felt tremendous shame for having broken when he “took the 
ropes.” 26  Stockdale’s point was that this man’s shame was understandable, and a 
morally appropriate response to being coerced to do what he found ignominious. 
Stoicism may, of course, hold out suicide as the option in cases where one’s will 
is so restricted that meaningful autonomy is impossible (for Kant, suicide seems 
restricted to cases where the commission of grave iniquity against others is the 
only resort.)27 I cannot fully explore those themes here, except to note that one 
longs for some kind of Stoic discussion of tragic hamartia (error or misdeed) 
of the sort Aristotle offers in recognition of the fate of good persons in tragic 
circumstances.28
3. Stoics on the Body in Pain
 We tend to think of a Stoic sage as finding a sliver of meaningful agency 
even in the moment of the most abject helplessness. But there is a flip side to 
this, and that is that finding that modicum of agency requires stripping away 
everything that one can’t master. It requires drawing a bright stripe between what 
is and what is not within one’s power.  And, so perhaps the Stoics would have 
us envision torture as less a case of vulnerable agency, than a case of involuntary 
experience, whether as prolonged protoemotions in response to stimuli that 
overwhelm the system or on some other model. The Stoic view of the body 
becomes critical to this picture. Perhaps we are to imagine the pain of physical 
and psychological torture as passive events. The agent becomes totally a patient, 
the recipient of another’s will, and in the extreme, a disembodied medium in 
which things happen.
 The view seems counterintuitive. Pain is in my body; it is mine; it forces 
consciousness upon me; it disturbs, awakens one out of any passivity or calm. 
It forces me to heed it, to assuage it. It takes command and forces an agenda 
of what I can or will do to make it stop. And yet the also familiar view of pain 
as alienated experience focuses on an aspect of Stoic doctrine. The body is an 
indifferent. And while the sage would rather have a healthy body than a feeble or 
thoroughly broken one, and will select prudentially for those outcomes, bodily 
strength and physical well-being are not themselves elements of happiness. The 
body is not identified with the self or with one’s ultimate good. There is no 
sense of the Freudian bodily ego — a sense of “me” in my body and my body as 
the frontier of self:
When you wish your body to be sound, is it in your own power, 
or is it not? — ‘It is not.’ When you wish it to be healthy? — ‘Nor 
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this.’ When you wish it to be handsome? — ‘Nor this.’ And to 
live, or die? — ‘Nor this.’ Our body, then, is not our own, but 
subject to everything stronger than itself.29
 The body is itself an external, which in virtue of its needs and desires, is 
encumbered by a further layer of externals. Hunger, thirst, and sexual urges direct 
us outward and make us dependent on what we find and lose:30
Is your poor body, then, enslaved or free?…. Do you not know 
that it is a slave to fever, gout, eye-disease, dysentery; to a tyrant; 
of fire, and steel; to everything that is stronger than itself? –Yes, 
it is a slave. How then can anything belonging to the body be 
unhindered?31
You ought to treat your entire body like a poor, overburdened 
ass, as long as it is possible, as long as it is allowed you; but if 
it pressed into public service and a soldier should lay hold of 
it, let it go. Do not resist or mutter, otherwise you will get a 
beating, and lose your poor ass just the same. When this is the 
way in which you should conduct yourself with regard to the 
body, consider what is left for you to do about the things that 
are procured for the sake of the body. If the body be a little ass, 
those other things become bridles, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, 
fodder for the ass. Let these go too; dismiss them more quickly 
and more cheerfully than the little ass itself.32
 As bodies, we are little donkeys, weighted down by our worldly loads. We hold 
tight to those material loads, though they enslave as much as nurture. In essence, 
bodily well-being is excluded from happiness because it is not an unequivocal 
good. Reissuing a Platonic argument, the Stoics argue that goods like physical 
health and strength can be used for good or ill, in a way that genuine virtues 
cannot. So Epictetus asks, “Is health a good, and sickness an evil? No. What, 
then? Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill.”33
 Cicero registers a blunt complaint about the view: The Stoics “show concern 
for nothing but the mind, as if human beings had no body.”34 “When it comes 
to a happy life,” the Stoics simply argue that “the amount of bodily advantage 
has no relevance at all.”35
 The Stoics may be right to suggest that there are ways of making some 
experiences of trauma or pain, if not fully passive events, then tolerable, by 
spiritual or metaphysical transcendence and sublimation, (or less conscious 
psychological and hypnotic defenses of dissociation, splitting, and amnesia, or 
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the physiological anesthesia that pain may deliver as its own medicine). Women 
who have been raped often report a sense of dissociating from their bodies: It is 
not me who is being violated. The trauma of the “out of body experience” may 
become a trope for how other physical injuries become experienced, even when 
they are not violations of dignity, in the way that rape is. (So Wynona Ward, a 
lawyer and advocate for abused women and herself a victim of repeated sexual 
child abuse told me once that after a car accident in which she badly injured 
her leg, she reported to the doctor that she was experiencing no pain. Her leg 
did not even seem to be a part of her. She explained this to me as an attitude of 
disembodiment she had internalized after years of abuse by her father.)36
 But what is involved in many experiences of rape is the conflict that one 
is being forcibly and brutally acted upon, without consent or the possibility 
of retaliation and yet that one is a player in the drama, acquiescing, giving 
parts of one’s body to another for their use. The passivity/complicity poles can 
produce a sense of disgust and shame—disgust at the alienated and polluted 
body that can long retain the marks of a rapist’s will, and shame that through 
comportment, appearance, gesture, plan of route, one was an agent in the act, 
however compromised that agency.37 In other cases the shame is not so much 
about complicity as a failure (sometimes viewed by self as culpable) to block any 
sign or impression of complicity—e.g., as expressed in such thoughts as “one 
could have or should have been able to resist in some way.”
 Torture can reveal a similar inner conflict. In addition to the physical and 
psychological pain of torture, there is the anguish of experiencing oneself as 
complicit in one’s own torture. One may view onself as accepting the terms of 
that existence and at once a resister and a subscriber, or ally in one’s own torture. 
Here I think about the voice of a freed Guantanamo detainee from the UK, who 
explained (in a historic moment of actually hearing the voices of Guantanamo)38 
the kind of actions that landed him in solitary isolation for a month. He had been 
punished for  “hogging” an apple at mealtime — (he “hogged” it, he explained, 
because he thought he might become “peckish” later on). His choice of words is 
revealing. A schoolboy’s prank, hogging because you might become peckish, lands 
you, in this perverted world of Gitmo, in the soulless hell of solitary confinement. 
His sarcastic words mock the cruelty of the punishment. And yet those words 
betray some sense of culpability — that he knew the rules and took a costly risk 
when he could easily have subordinated his urges. He lives in two worlds, one 
in which he rebels against the perverted sense of justice in order to keep sane, 
another in which he is forced to accept its rules and regulate his wants, needs, 
and actions according to its logic.
 Even successful resistance may stand at the edge of an experience of being 
free and complicit. As a victim of torture one structures one’s agenda and agency 
around reading and outsmarting the will of one’s tormentor and the Spartan 
Stoic Equanimity in the Face of Torture      49
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 38 [2008], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol38/iss1/3
environment of one’s torture. As Timerman put it, I became a “blind architect” 
of the world of my torment,39 “blind” in that he had to make sense both of its 
overwhelming yet perverse and impoverished stimuli. There is participation in 
the perverted world and possible mastery in it. But there is a flip side. When a 
prisoner is kept for weeks in clothes caked with blood, reeking of the stench of 
urine and feces, the disgust of the tormentor can become one’s own.  Moreover, 
for those deprived for months on end of meaningful human connection, the 
connection with an interrogator, and his will, threatens to become the perverted 
form of rapport. This is precisely what the interrogator aims to exploit.
 These examples illustrate that resisting torture is not primarily or simply a 
matter of dissociating from bodily (or psychological) pain. (Though a conception 
of torture as just extreme pain is what the notorious Jay Bybee “torture memo” 
to Alberto Gonzalez memo seems have suggested.)40 Torture is trauma, physical 
and psychological, but not just trauma. It invokes one’s agency in the very 
experience of helplessness. In this sense it is an environment, par excellence, in 
which to be Stoic and show effort and mastery. But it is also an environment 
of severely compromised agency, and of experiencing one’s very agency as both 
internalizing the perverted governance and attitudes of one’s torturers and of 
being frustrated in one’s independent resistance of them.
4. Torture and the will
 In emphasizing detachment from the body and emotions, the Stoics seem to 
minimize the potential risk of the torture victim in compromises of agency and 
the concomitant emotions that are appropriate responses to that compromise. In 
Stockdale’s own Stoic lab, he emphasizes the positive moments of mastery and 
resistance: He did sit-ups in leg-irons, he commanded an active chain-of-command 
within the cell block from solitary confinement, he devised ways to bloody himself 
so he would not be paraded on TV as a propaganda item, he instructed others 
on how to resist in similar ways — much of this conveyed through code tapped on 
walls, swished in the sound of brushes against the inside of a “crap” bucket, and 
so on. These are all acts of resistance, attempts to resist the collusion and rapport 
that the torturer wants so desperately as the preferred method of conducting 
business. Timerman similarly describes resisting the wished for omnipotence of a 
torturer.41 Omnipotence manifests itself in the conversion of  “dirty, dark, gloomy 
places into a universe of spontaneous innovation,” with the unfettered torturer 
the author of ever new ignominious forms of torture and degradation:
In some ways he needs to demonstrate to me and to himself 
his capacity to grant things, to alter my world, my situation. 
To demonstrate to me that I need things that are inaccessible 
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to me and which only he can provide …. One feels tempted to 
combat this tendency on the part of the torturers, to confront 
it as almost a unique possibility for feeling oneself to be alive; 
yet such futile battles lead to nought. It’s best to acknowledge 
and accept the torturers’ omnipotence in such unimportant 
matters. (41)
The implication is that some types of acquiescence to the torturer’s omnipotence 
will not be self-annihilating; others may. It is a matter of picking and choosing 
one’s battles.
 But of course the choices aren’t always one’s own and some moments pick 
themselves and one colludes without particular caution or wariness.  So Timerman 
tells of a guard passing in front of a Jewish male prisoner, standing naked, with 
his circumcised penis exposed to the torturers’ gaze:
A guard passes in front of an elderly Jew and makes a joke about 
his circumscribed penis—his clipped prick. The Jew smiles, too, 
and blushes. As if apologizing. Or at least that’s how it strikes 
the guard, who dismisses it with a gesture. The old man looks 
at me, again blushes, and I have the sense that he is trying to 
explain things to me. (67)
Two successive glances, almost simultaneous. The guard imagines 
he’s being asked forgiveness. I imagine that I’m being implored to 
understand. The guard forgives him. I understand him. (67)
 The glimpse is painful, though if lines can be drawn, this is more a scene 
of degradation than torture, by most definitions. It is not a scene of abject 
helplessness, neither in the face of violent physical abuse, nor in the face of 
extreme psychological stressors—as in being exposed to constant loud music or 
screaming, or short shackled to the floor with unmuzzled dogs barking at one’s 
face, or submerged in water and made to feel as if one is drowning. Rather, it is 
a scene in which an elderly man is publicly exposed, has no fig leaf to cover his 
naked appearance, and in this moment, takes on the guard’s view of his corporal 
depravity. He apologizes for his “clipped prick,” he asks for forgiveness, and then 
he asks his fellow Jew to understand his shame and betrayal.
 We can imagine moments like this outside the context of torture. They are 
moments of shame and humiliation, more generally, moments, where, again to 
appeal to Velleman’s model, one has lost or been compromised in the ability 
adequately to control one’s public persona. In the case of torture, the means of 
self-presentation are thoroughly compromised. One is at the mercy of another’s 
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gaze, will, and power, in how one controls one’s body, its needs, its grooming 
and posture, one’s sleep pattern, ritual and religious practices, social contact, 
family ties and the like.42
 Here, the elderly Jew represents himself through the eyes of the guard, 
though he knows those eyes mercilessly distort.  Nonetheless, he has come to 
measure himself through their gaze. He is ashamed of what he sees and that he 
sees through these distorted lens. He seeks forgiveness for how he sees and what 
he sees. And then is ashamed of his shame before his fellow Jew.
 These examples are about the distress of having respect taken away through 
contempt and then an internalization of that contempt in self-contempt. 
They represent an undermining of rational agency not specific to torture but 
characteristic of some aspects of it. Consider a different kind of case — being 
prevented from exercising control of body functions that are typically loci of 
self-control. Again, from detainees just released from Guantanamo, I heard first 
hand of their ordeal of being “processed” by U. S. troops at Bagram air field 
base for eight to ten hours, skimpily dressed in freezing cold weather; of being 
made to walk in circles with bare feet on sand mixed with shards of glass without 
being allowed to use toilets; of urinating and defecating on themselves, and of 
then being shackled in stress positions for a 10 hour flight to Guantanamo Bay--
hooded, eyes taped, and again without being allowed to relieve themselves except 
on themselves.
 Peeing or shitting on oneself, because one is denied more decent forms of 
relief, is a salient form of experiencing oneself as an agent without agency—one 
lets oneself do it; the case is not like that of  a toddler who has not yet mastered 
bladder or sphincter control or an infirm person who has lost it. This is actively 
doing it (and of willfully controlling it up to a certain point), and yet it is being 
made to do it on oneself. It is experiencing oneself as helpless in that agency. And 
it is humiliating.
 Here what is vulnerable is the will and the psychological distress of using that 
will against oneself. Even if one is somehow dissociated from one’s body and its 
pain, as a Stoic may be, and identified, rather, with one’s will and affective attitude 
toward it, this is still an affront. It is a misuse of one’s will. One is an agent, but 
consigned to use that agency in a betrayal of what one knows, in principle, is 
still a matter of one’s control.
 “The chair,” the latest device in forcefeeding hunger striking detainees, presents 
a slightly different case of force and collusion. A decision to go on hunger strike 
is itself a complicated matter, and depending on varying circumstances, may 
or may not be an autonomous or reflective choice. But assume a striker makes 
such a choice in a modestly reflective way and accepts, or better, acquiesces to the 
consequence, in the sense of not forcibly protesting, the anesthetized insertion 
of feeding tubes in one’s nose. In the current cases, one can imagine that what 
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the victim was unlikely to have accepted as part of the anticipated bargain, is that 
he would be strapped to a chair, prevented from movement or purging, force fed 
diuretics and laxatives, and then forced to urinate and defecate on oneself.43 Here 
the issue, again, is less about physical pain than a particular form of psychological 
anguish—namely, anguish directed at the perversion of one’s will experienced as 
if at one’s own hands. A cruel mockery is made of the victim’s attempt to take 
charge of his body by a hunger strike. Inserting a feeding tube is itself a way to 
undermine that agency. Making the victim then defecate on himself is a way of 
getting him to experience himself as colluding in the mockery. It is also a way to 
get hunger strikers to stop striking44
 J. M. Coetzee gives insight into the phenomenon in his powerful fictional 
description of the old South African magistrate, who as punishment for consorting 
with a Barbarian woman, himself becomes tortured like the Barbarians:
In my suffering there is nothing ennobling. Little of what I call 
suffering is even pain. What I am made to undergo is subjection 
to the most rudimentary needs of my body: to drink, to relieve itself, 
to find the posture in which it is least sore. When Warrant Officer 
Mandel and his man first brought me back here and lit the 
lamp and closed the door, I wondered how much pain a plump 
comfortable old man would be able to endure in the name of 
his eccentric notions of how the Empire should conduct itself. 
But my torturers were not interested in degrees of pain. They 
were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to 
live in a body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions 
of justice only as long as it is whole and well, which very soon 
forgets them when its head is gripped and a pipe is pushed down 
its gullet and pints of salt water are poured into it till it coughs 
and retches and flails and voids itself. (Waiting for the Barbarians, 
115; italics added.)
 In Coetzee’s example of the torture victim, the body and experience of pain 
have become alien. Living in the body becomes a matter of giving up the body to 
the designs and caprice of the torturer’s ordeal—to being drowned in salt water 
and then flailing and voiding itself. The ordeal, from which there is no physical 
escape (and only possible psychological distance), is about dehumanization in 
the most basic areas of human control—“to drink, to relieve oneself, to find the 
posture in which one is least sore.” These are the vulnerabilities, burdens of a 
body, as Epictetus warns. His Stoic consolation is that we can learn to say, and 
come to believe, that “they are nothing to me.” In short, one can practice the 
indifference that trauma might induce. That indifference may be adaptive in 
enduring torture and ordeals. But it perverts a healthy sense of how we live in a 
body that we, and not an omnipotent tormentor, use to express our intentions, 
Stoic Equanimity in the Face of Torture      53
18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 38 [2008], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol38/iss1/3
emotions, and will.
5. Concluding Thoughts: Becoming a torturer
It would seem, then, that a broadly Stoic view still leaves a torture victim 
vulnerable to being forced to use one’s agency against oneself in the most degrading 
ways. (To claim that this is viable mastery, just because it is active use of one’s will, 
is a perversion of what mastery is about.) In this sense, Stoic armor has its limits. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Stoicism’s more durable lesson may be in averting the 
temptation to inflict torture rather than in enduring it in a bulletproof way.
The point seems an obvious one. But in closing I want to say a few words. 
It might be argued, and has been argued, that a training in Stoicism where one 
learns to toughen oneself up  (“suck it up”, to put it less politely) in the face of 
pain and deprivation is a good training ground for torture.45 In a contemporary 
version of the argument, some have claimed that training in torture resistance 
schools (of the sort many soldiers and special operations forces go through, such 
as at Fort Bragg’s SERE —“survival, evasion, resistance, escape”— school) is at once 
a training in becoming a torturer.46 It is easy to see the flaw in this argument, 
but it is worth pointing it out in Stoic terms.
Stoicism teaches toughening and detachment from the body not so that 
one can become indifferent to intentionally inflicting harm on others, but so 
that one can better endure one’s own frailty. Of course one may always use any 
skill for good or ill. This is a cornerstone of Socratic teaching.47 The Stoics are 
committed to the related thesis that indifferents are indifferents precisely because 
they are not unconditionally good or evil in their own right. Their goodness is 
conditional and must be regulated from outside by virtue or wisdom. The point is 
a general one. The skills of resistance in the hands of the wrong person can lead 
to torture. So too the medical science of trauma in the hands of a psychologist 
advising on torture can become  a tool not of healing but of harming. The Stoics 
are far from simpleminded about the challenge of subordinating goods to the 
work of virtue. Indeed, here is where Stoic notions of the attitudes and emotions 
of virtue, the “equable” emotions, so to speak, may play their strongest role: A 
good person feels and registers the pull of institutional pressures and the forces 
of others’ evil. But for her, it is a moment to beware and to be wary, to take stock, 
rather than to be afraid or capitulate to those pressures. It is a moment to hold 
tight to one’s virtue. Still, the cost of standing one’s ground may be high. And the 
Stoics may indeed underestimate, as I have said in this paper, just what enduring 
others’ evil may involve, including how that evil may exploit one’s own will.
Georgetown University
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